Can we talk about a renaissance of Orthodoxy in Kazakhstan?

The attitude of Kazakhstanis to religion is one of the most sensitive and discussed topics in the country. But, as a rule, Muslims are always in the spotlight, while the life of the Orthodox remains in the shadows. Although the latter make up about 20 percent of the population of Kazakhstan...

According to the data obtained during the last population census, the most religious people in our country are the Kazakhs - almost 90% indicated their affiliation with the faith. The second place is occupied by Russians - about 86%, including 85.5% who profess Orthodoxy. While in almost all other more or less large ethnic groups, the share of believers does not exceed 73% (among Uzbeks and Tatars it is slightly higher - around 78%).

Questions arise. Is the Slavic population of Kazakhstan really so religious, including the youth? Can we talk about a wave of Orthodox revival in the country, by analogy with the renaissance of Islam? Or is this just deceitful (or incorrect) statistics? And what are the general trends characteristic of the Orthodox Church in Kazakhstan? Are there any contradictions within it – ideological, personal, etc.? The experts have a say.

Iakov Vorontsov, Orthodox priest:
"Indifference to religion is growing among young people"

- I think that the census results need to be adjusted. In the sense that not all people who declare their affiliation with a particular confession are practicing parishioners. In general, Kazakhstani society is not very religious. According to my observations, in the Russian-speaking segment, indifference to religion is growing among young people. At the same time, there is a high percentage of both supporters of agnosticism and people prone to pseudo-religious superstitions.

Alas, there is no point in talking about a renaissance of Orthodoxy in Kazakhstan. This is hindered by the reforms of Patriarch Kirill, aimed at strengthening the centralization, bureaucratization and formalization of church life, as well as the personnel policy he is pursuing.

In general, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), of which the Metropolitan District in the Republic of Karelia is an integral part, is currently experiencing a crisis associated with growing mistrust of the leadership and the low level of religious education not only of parishioners but also of the clergy. Theological science is also in decline. Instead, great efforts are being invested in maintaining the ideological foundations of Russian statehood and the national identity of parishioners as Russians.

If we talk about Kazakhstan, then in our country these processes are not so obvious and are significantly weakened. However, the justification and support of military aggression against Ukraine by the highest hierarchs and media-active members of the Russian Orthodox Church are destructive to the life of the local church. Trying not to talk about politics, parishioners are divided into those for whom Putin is a hero and liberator, and those for whom he is a tyrant and murderer.

Arman Kudabay, journalist, teacher at the Al-Farabi Kazakh National University:
"There are no active moods and contradictions in the Orthodox environment"

- Firstly, one should not confuse officially recognized confessions, to which the majority of the Orthodox population of Kazakhstan considers themselves, and sectarians, schismatics and others. Although even sectarians in Orthodoxy, for the most part, except for competition with the dominant church for parishes, do not pose any particular danger to it or to the state as a whole. There are no "schools" in Orthodoxy that aim to seize power. As far as we know, even the Old Believers do not strictly oppose themselves to society and the authorities. And in general, there is no need to talk about the fact that sectarian trends of Orthodoxy have any weight among our Christian population.

Secondly, the dominant church itself is not particularly keen to revive/strengthen Orthodoxy in the country. Accordingly, there is no talk of active sentiments (and even less contradictions) in this environment. As a university teacher, for example, I have not noticed any religious fervor in Russian-speaking youth circles. I remember there were a couple of cases in the 1990s when, in the middle of their studies, guys went to a monastery. But I have not encountered anything like that since. And when there are no ardent adherents of a particular faith, or very few of them, then conflicts are unlikely.

Why does this often happen in the Muslim environment? This is primarily due to the peculiarities of the relationship between the official religious school and other schools (madhhabs), which can hardly be called even peaceful. After all, “Islamic sects”, there is no other way to say it, such as ISIS/DAESH, the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Vilayat Khorasan and others openly set the goal of their existence to seize power and change the world in their own way. The problem is that our muftiate and government agencies supervising the religious sphere cannot always counter their propaganda technologies. Can this be considered a “revival of Islam” or a “Muslim renaissance”? No. Rather, it is the strengthening of the influence of sectarianism in Kazakhstan...

Elena Burova, chief researcher at the Institute of Philosophy, Political Science and Religious Studies (IPRS) of the Ministry of Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
"Orthodox Christians are less likely to be members of a community and less likely to follow religious norms"

- If we evaluate the existence of Orthodoxy in the country not only by the number and structure of the flock, but also by new churches, by the prestige of the status of a spiritual mentor, by the degree of desire to receive special religious education and practical experience, then the conclusion about its sustainable development in the realities of Kazakhstan is quite justified.

In general, the religious process in modern Kazakhstan is synchronized with global and regional trends and at the same time has its own specifics. We can say that we have completed the stage of the renaissance of religion, which began in the 1990s and was associated with a rethinking of its role after a long period of atheization of society. And now the stage of revitalization (restoration) of religion has come in those of its purposes that are important for a person, society and the state.

Over these years, a structure of the population's religiosity has been formed in which nominal believers (who do not practice religion and are not part of communities) predominate, and who also have a tendency to "rejuvenate". The younger and middle generations also dominate among practicing believers. But while the number of Islamic youth is growing, the number of Orthodox youth is decreasing. There are more and more atheists and non-confessional believers. Along with authentic religiosity, there is quasi-religiosity and radical religiosity. There is also hidden and demonstrative religiosity (as well as atheism).

Religious processes are influenced by many factors: the demographic situation, migration, weakening of the ideological influence of public institutions, etc. At the same time, Kazakhstani society remains multi-ethnic and multi-confessional, and this contributes to diverse religious self-identity, including detraditionalization and conversion (change of orientation). But ethnicity still remains the main determining factor when choosing a confession: Kazakhs identify themselves with Islam, and Russians with Orthodoxy. Only 27% of citizens surveyed by our institute (IFPR) stated that when choosing religious beliefs, it is not necessary to adhere to ethnocultural tradition.

In addition, studies record differentiation in the degree of immersion in religion among representatives of various confessions. Orthodox Christians are less likely to be members of a community and less likely to follow religious norms (6.9%) than Muslims (19.3%) and representatives of other faiths, such as Catholicism (48.3%). This is explained by the fact that for the latter, religion is an important area of ​​identity, and they are characterized by high community cohesion.

In general, religious worldview, values, and traditions have come to determine the lifestyle of every fifth Kazakhstani. However, among them, only 6-9% strictly follow all religious regulations. 34.7-36.1% of respondents call themselves believers and try to observe religious norms, but at the same time, they rarely, only on holidays, visit mosques, temples, Catholic churches, prayer houses, etc. 60-65%, as I have already said, are nominally believers, although they indicated their religious affiliation during the national census. Some respondents - from 6% to 26% depending on the region - identify as non-denominational believers, that is, having individual ideas about religion.

The IFPR research also revealed the following trend: as the age of respondents who chose Islam and Orthodoxy increases, their religious involvement changes. If among 18-24-year-old respondents the share of those who are members of a religious community and follow religious norms is 23.2%, then among 45-54-year-olds the number is already half as much - 11.7%. As one of our experts emphasized, for young people religion is most likely a tribute to tradition, and for adults it is a conscious need for faith, a more meaningful attitude to religious values. Moreover, the involvement of Islamic and Orthodox youth is diametrically opposed, as mentioned above.

According to respondents, the following are the means of integration of youth and religion (in descending order): social environment (friends, colleagues, acquaintances) – 24.7%; parents and family traditions – 22.5%; fashion for “religiosity” – 21.3%; opportunity for socialization, including in religious communities – 13.5%; influence of foreign preachers – 3.4%; support in difficult situations – 2.2%.

To summarize, I will note that religion in Kazakhstani society has multiple perceptions, and the motives for being a religious person are also not the same. The opinions of believers from different faiths and experts on this matter do not always coincide. In general, the latter associate the conversion of Kazakhstanis to religion with a crisis of ideology, the loss of the previous system of values, the emergence of an ideological vacuum, and a deformation of the understanding of spirituality. In this situation, religious institutions continue to perform the functions of forming a worldview and a system of moral values, providing psychological support, and introducing people to approved religious behavior.

author Saule Isabaeva .

https://spik.kz/1950-mozhno-li-govorit-o-renessanse-pravoslavija-v-kazahstane.html